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Data fusion centers have been around since the 
9/11 terrorist attacks but have been shackled with an 
underperforming label. Products from fusion centers 
often do not support the mission of the organizations 
supporting the centers.  This paper addresses the 
questions of what are the historical barriers to 
information sharing, and how can fusion centers 
become more efficient and effective in this role? The 
research and experience of the authors are viewed 
through a Knowledge Management lens to propose 
using Structured Analytic Technique exercises coupled 
with applying knowledge management tools and 
concepts to improve knowledge flow and the relevance 
and quality of the intelligence products produced.  
1. Introduction  
State and local fusion centers were initially created 
in the wake of the 9/11 Commission Report to help 
“connect the dots” of seemingly disparate threat 
indicators and, through information sharing, aid the 
federal counterterrorism mission at the grassroots level.  
Today this system consists of 79 centers: Forty-two 
states and territories each have single primary centers, 
while a dozen states (notably Texas and California) have 
additional “recognized” centers to cover key regions [1].  
While fusion centers have assisted in identifying leads 
for what would become counterterrorism investigations, 
their day-to-day utility is increasingly an all-crimes, all-
hazards mission [2].  Fusion centers are made up of 
personnel from multiple law enforcement organizations 
at the state and local level and federal agencies, and may 
include civilian analysts as well.   
The value of fusion centers is far more than the sum 
of their parts, and recognizing the many non-
counterterrorism functions they fulfill is important in 
demonstrating this.  This is not always easy to validate, 
and fusion centers have come under significant criticism 
and scrutiny since their inception.  The criticism that 
fusion centers receive stems from the poorly defined and 
loosely understood method in which they are evaluated.  
Assessments’ of fusion centers are based on metrics 
having to do with percentage of products answering 
national requirements, customers’ satisfaction with 
fusion center products, numbers of products produced, 
and the perception of supported agencies [3].  The 
difficulty with having a report card tied to arbitrary 
production metrics rather than results is that the focus 
inevitably shifts to meet expected numbers instead of 
meeting expected results.  An example consequence of 
national grading requirements is that only 10% of the 
fusion center distributable products created in 2016 
addressed state/local customer information needs [4].   
The goal of any endeavor in intelligence is to 
increase the understanding of a particular problem set 
within a target audience.  Whether the target audience 
consists of decision makers, action takers, or those who 
are only tangentially affected, the reason for conducting 
the function of intelligence is to apply analysis to 
information in order to answer the question, “so what” 
[5].  Quite often that function is much easier said than 
done due to both the subjectivity and complexity 
involved with interpreting partial and incomplete data to 
draw meaningful conclusions.  As with many complex 
processes, the function of intelligence is at the same 
time highly structured and very fluid.  Governed by 
recognized standards at the national level, organizations 
that belong to and adhere to these Intelligence 
Community Directives (ICDs) establish strict 
procedures to review and handle quality control for any 
analytical products they create [6].  Likewise, these 
standards guide every part of the analytical process. 
The member organizations of the Intelligence 
Community (IC) each operate under specific charters, 
whose actions and foci are made distinct by varying 
authorities within the mission of the organization.  
Because many aspects of those specific missions have a 
domestic aspect, even more complexity is introduced as 





protections are enacted to preserve the privacy and 
respect the First Amendment Rights of U.S. Persons [2].  
Additionally, the domestic realm is where the national 
security responsibilities of federal agencies most often 
intersect and have the potential to overlap with state and 
local law enforcement organizations. 
It is out of this delicate environment that fusion 
centers developed.  Fusion centers are defined as a 
collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 
resources, expertise, and/or information to the center 
with a goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, 
apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity 
[7].  Predictably, with so many converging interests to 
serve, fusion centers have come under regular critical 
review.  Privacy organizations have criticized the role of 
domestic intelligence centers, government 
accountability watchdogs and congressional reviews 
have targeted the viability and return-on-investment 
from fusion centers, and many practitioners of law 
enforcement and intelligence within the homeland 
security arena have questioned the efficacy and 
efficiency of fusion centers as information sharing hubs 
[8].   The centers have their defenders, as well, and while 
much of what is written on fusion centers in professional 
and peer-reviewed journals could be interpreted as 
critical of at least one function they perform, there is 
also a consensus that the requirement they were created 
to fill is a crucial one [9].  
This paper addresses the research questions of what 
are the historical barriers to information sharing, and 
how can fusion centers become more efficient and 
effective in this role?  These questions are researched 
using a case study research on a Structured Analytic 
Technique exercise to observe information sharing 
barriers and proposes that applying the concepts of the 
modified knowledge pyramid (figure 1) [10] would help 
fusion centers create a strategy to produce actionable 
intelligence and thus improve the effectiveness of the 
fusion center. 
 
Figure 1, Jennex Revised Knowledge Pyramid [10] 
 
2. Background 
As previously stated, state and local fusion centers 
were created from the feedback and insight of the 9/11 
Commission Report, and the demonstrable need for 
formalized information sharing between federal, state 
and local entities.  This proved difficult to accomplish 
in execution.  Congressional studies, Department of 
Homeland Security annual reports, and academic work 
from security and intelligence professionals were all 
very blunt in identifying their weaknesses.  Multiple 
attempts were made to establish fusion center guidelines 
and delineate a set of baseline capabilities, while 
acknowledging that fusion centers at the state and local 
level were prone to develop in ways that seemed to fit a 
regional niche [11].  A recurring theme in critiques is 
that while fusion centers were quick to adapt in ways 
that would add value, primarily at the local and regional 
level, the activities they undertook were not what would 
traditionally be defined as the “true fusion” of all 
sources of intelligence [8]. 
The Department of Defense definition of fusion is 
a multilevel, multifaceted process dealing with the 
automatic detection, association, correlation, 
estimation, and combination of data and information 
from single or multiple sources [12].  The Department 
of Justice, in establishing the guidelines for state and 
local fusion centers, characterized the fusion process by 
its ability to combine possibly uncertain, incomplete, 
and contradictory data, perhaps resulting in data or 
information of improved quality [12].  Together, these 
concepts form the key function which state and local 
centers were created to perform, with the process 
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Figure 2. The Fusion Process Overview [13] 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the perpetual activities 
undertaken by fusion centers, and places them into their 
proper order.  Each step of this process can be done by 
organizations which contribute to fusion center efforts 
at their own facilities.  The strength which fusion centers 
bring is the ability to conduct all these steps within the 
same physical location, decreasing the time the cycle 
takes to complete and thereby increasing the capacity to 
execute multiple cycles. 
The most effective fusion centers are collocated 
with agencies or task forces fulfilling other existing 
functions, such as High-Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Areas or Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  Layering fusion 
centers with existing multi-agency organizations was 
meant to leverage existing relationships to further 
improve information sharing.  This led to fusion centers 
expanding from the initial roles of counterterrorism 
analysis into a more all-crime/all-hazards approach.  
Fusion centers added mission sets to fill observed gaps 
within their regions, supporting investigations, de-
conflicting local law enforcement operations, or 
supporting special events, all of which have 
exponentially increased the amount of information that 
they consume.  One thing all these functions require, 
however, is effective use of this information.  This is 
where the concepts of knowledge and information 
management come into play, which facilitate the 
following analysis to produce intelligence.  With as 
much data and raw information as is available, a method 
to triage, identify information of value, and disseminate 
that information is vital. 
Fusion centers support the drive for evidence based 
decision making. Figure 1, the revised Knowledge 
Pyramid shows technologies that gather and analyze 
observations of reality faster than and in amounts 
greater than what humans can process as the filters that 
support the creation of actionable intelligence [10].  This 
model provides value by showing relationships between 
technologies and decision support artifacts (Internet of 
things, big data, data, information, knowledge, 
intelligence) and by providing a model that assists in 
creating a strategy for selecting and managing 
technologies to create actionable intelligence for 
immediate decision making.  
The model assists fusion center managers in 
planning and creating a knowledge management (KM) 
strategy to guide fusion center activities.  A KM strategy 
is a statement of how knowledge will be captured and 
used.  Fusion centers need to have a KM strategy for 
managing the layers of knowing and technologies in the 
revised knowledge pyramid.  Jennex [14] [15] found 
having a KM strategy improved performance through 
better decision making; and identified the components 
needed in this strategy.  The basic components of a KM 
strategy can be generalized and made useful for 
managing knowledge pyramid activities including: 
• Identification of users of the knowledge pyramid 
layers and transformation processes 
• Identification of actionable intelligence needed to 
support decision making 
• Identification of sources of big data, data, 
information, and knowledge 
• Identification of big data, data, information, and 
knowledge to be captured 
• Identification of how captured big data, data, 
information, and knowledge is to be stored and 
represented 
• Identification of technologies to be used to support 
capturing and processing big data, data, 
information, and knowledge 
• Generation of top management support 
• Establishment of metrics for big data, data, 
information, and knowledge use 
• Establishment of feedback and adjustment process 
on the effectiveness of actionable intelligence use 
The goal is to add a top down strategy approach based 
on the decisions to be made and identifying the 
technologies and decision support components needed, 
to the bottom up data discovery process currently used.  
Additionally, the more focused the strategy the stronger 
the filters that are created blocking big data, data, 
information, and knowledge not needed to support 
decision making. 
3. Methodology  
In preparing this paper, the authors utilized official 
reviews and Congressional Research Study reports 
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discussing the challenges facing fusion centers as they 
have matured in the years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
The key arguments detailing inefficiencies and 
perceived weaknesses were then viewed and analyzed 
from a KM lens, with the resulting observations leading 
to a recommendation for improving the effectiveness on 
how the massive amounts of data are processed, 
disseminated, and used. This paper also uses a 
Structured Analytic Technique exercise as described by 
Heuer and Pherson [16] as a case of a method that fusion 
centers could regularly implement to specifically 
address the challenges of knowledge sharing.   
The Structured Analytic Technic case is presented 
to demonstrate and discuss how the analysts approached 
the data in this setting and utilized a flexible set of 
structured analytic options to transform that data into 
information, capture it as knowledge, and press it 
forward as actionable intelligence in line with the KM 
pyramid in figure 1.  The participants in this case were 
members of regional security committee within the San 
Diego public sector representing federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies.  The SAT exercise was held 
in San Diego in the summer of 2018.  The SAT analytic 
scenario was to assess the likelihood of three distinctive 
threat vectors occurring within the region.  Reporting 
that originated from both local and federal law 
enforcement organizations was reviewed, analyzed, and 
interpreted by the participating analysts.  During this 
single day event, the analysis led the participants to 
identify gaps, create intelligence and information 
requirements, and conduct analyst-to-analyst 
coordination among adjacent organizations with 
sympathetic interests in the security of their region.  
These efforts simultaneously completed several steps of 
the intelligence cycle, depicted in the diagram below. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Intelligence Cycle [17] 
 
The approximately 20 participating members 
represented six organizations from the local government 
level to federal law enforcement agencies.  Eight of the 
participants were also representatives from their 
organizations to the security committee, while the 
remaining analysts were brought in from the member 
organizations to provide additional experience and 
different perspectives.   
Participants were split into three similarly sized 
teams, each focused on one aspect of the scenario.  
Analysis material comprised of threat reporting and 
crime data provided by the participating member 
organizations from the prior two years.   
The first team conducted structured brainstorming 
to generate a range of hypotheses [16] and quickly 
surmised that there were significant gaps in the available 
reporting that hindered the ability to create relevant and 
specific hypotheses based on the evidence.  However, 
the divergent thinking process led to the identification 
of a series of conditions that existed which lacked any 
of the type of reporting seen.  The techniques of creating 
a list of descriptive indicators [16] was then used to 
create a specific and descriptive list of expected 
indicators for a number of distinct scenarios which were 
translated into and captured as intelligence 
requirements.  By identifying the conditions that 
enabled the activities noted in the relevant reporting, the 
team was able to extrapolate additional scenarios and 
create a series of observable indicators to prove or 
disprove hypotheses.   
The second team conducted a thorough analysis of 
competing hypotheses against their problem set, a useful 
tool to combat the phenomenon of satisficing, or going 
with the first answer that seems to be supported by the 
evidence [16].  Analysis of competing hypotheses 
requires analysts to identify and then try to refute as 
many reasonable hypotheses as possible using the full 
range of data, assumptions, and gaps that are pertinent 
to the problem at hand [16].  By trying to disprove an 
analytical hypothesis, it forces the participants to go 
against their own assumptions and look beyond any 
potential cognitive biases by looking specifically for 
reporting or indicators which support a single, mutually 
exclusive theory while discounting those which support 
multiple, mutually-exclusive theories.   
The third team used a quadrant hypothesis 
generation model to prioritize responses to scenarios 
stemming from two primary drivers.  This tool is used 
when the situation is affected by relatively few driving 
forces, and identifies four potential scenarios that 
represent the extreme conditions for each of the two 
major drivers [16].  This enabled them to extrapolate the 
unique indicators which would point to one of the four 
potentialities. 
4. Findings  
While the initial goal of the session was not fully 
met (an assessment of the likelihood of several threat 
vectors occurring in the region), there were a number of 
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valuable take-a-ways and results.  On the strategic level 
for the region multiple gaps in the collective knowledge 
were specifically identified and captured, along with the 
creation of observable indicators that would answer 
those gaps.  At the organizational level, analysts from 
the participating agencies had the opportunity to expand 
their perspective on issues they work on as a daily part 
of their jobs, as well as creating ‘boundary-spanning’ 
relationships with their peers in adjacent agencies.  
Individually, each analyst expanded their knowledge of 
both the capabilities and limitations of each 
participating agency, improved their understanding of 
their own problem set, and brought back to their agency 
both the procedural knowledge to recreate this process 
on additional topics and the specific knowledge of the 
problem we analyzed as a group. 
The execution of the SAT effort accomplished 
more than just a transfer of knowledge across 
participating agencies.  The benefits were threefold: 
data was presented that had not previously been viewed 
by all parties; capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of 
participating agencies were shared and discussed 
amongst the group; and relationships were fostered to 
further the sharing of both information and knowledge 
on an analyst-to-analyst level into the future.  A 
previous key critique [2] was that little ‘true fusion, or 
analysis of disparate data sources, identification of 
intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of 
intelligence against those gaps which could contribute 
to prevention is occurring.  The analytic exchange which 
occurred in the course of a single day accomplished all 
of these tasks on a regional level.  New data was shared 
among all members, formal analytical processes were 
executed to fuse the data into information, and then the 
information into intelligence, and the resulting 
intelligence was further examined to identify gaps in 
knowledge and craft requirements to drive future 
collections and operations. 
Leveraging boundary-spanning analysts with 
overlapping interests, the intelligence produced by the 
group was of far greater value than the sum of its parts.  
Those participating analysts returned to their agencies at 
the end of the day with actionable information that could 
be injected into the specific collection management 
operations of their own organizations.  Additionally, 
they could then brief their leadership on the 
complementary and supporting activities of their partner 
agencies to produce a greater situational awareness of 
friendly efforts along similar lines of effort.   
The analysis was recorded in an after-action report 
(AAR) that captured the step-by-step process each team 
took to approach the problem they faced.  The AAR 
recorded the specific inputs and ideas generated by each 
group, to include hypotheses and theories, allowing 
supervisors or analysts looking at the same issues to 
retrace the steps of the exercise.  The intelligence 
portion of the effort was captured in a brief for the 
regional security committee’s executive steering group.  
The brief highlighted to the committee’s leadership key 
concerns and information gaps identified by the 
analysis, as well as recommended strategies for 
educational outreach to improve the amount of relevant 
threat reporting coming in.  At the brief, the lead 
analysts were able to present additional efforts 
undertaken by participating agencies which were 
spurred by the analytical effort, demonstrating the value 
of ‘actionable analysis.’  In one case, a specific gap 
identified by the collaborating analysts initiated an 
operation within a participating law enforcement 
organization that resulted in the arrests of individuals 
who had been attempting to exploit the very 
vulnerabilities the group highlighted. 
With the resulting intelligence taken for action by 
participating agencies immediately after its generation, 
there was no time lost between the conduct of the 
analysis and waiting for a formal product to be 
published.  The formal, structured process of this 
method captures every input, as well as the thought 
process and interpretation of data used to form the 
analytic line, easily allowing supervisors or objective 
observers to audit and review the results.  This ease of 
auditing acts as quick balance to the lengthy review 
process conducted for written analytical products.  
Focusing on the immediate applicability of the ingested 
information speeds up the intelligence cycle functions 
by combining processing and exploitation with analysis 
and production, so that the resulting dissemination and 
integration can directly be utilized to spur action (See 
figure 3).  Those actions then produce new inputs that 
drive evaluation and feedback to let the analysts know 
whether their work has been useful and help to answer 
gaps that were previously identified. 
This process is the same that occurs in any 
organization doing work in the intelligence field, 
however, it was focused and streamlined within the 
fertile microcosm of a collaborative and structured 
analytical setting.  Absent only the functions of planning 
and direction and collection, the SAT session facilitates 
the timely translation of data first into information and 
then directly into intelligence [18].  These concepts will 
further be explained in the next segment, as the 
successful and replicable processes demonstrated by 
executing collaborative SATs are further unpacked in 
the light of KM. 
5. Discussion  
Fusion Centers conduct or contribute to a statewide 
and/or regional risk assessment that identifies and 
prioritizes threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences at 
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regular intervals [19].  These regular assessments take 
several forms, and also offer ideal opportunities for 
cross-organization coordination and collaboration.  This 
paper presented a case where a SAT process was used 
by a multi-agency organization to improve knowledge 
sharing and increase effectiveness of actionable 
intelligence generation. It is anticipated that other fusion 
centers can leverage their combined analytic strength 
through focused SATs to craft timely, sound, and 
relevant intelligence.  The result would be ideal for both 
independent agency operations and shared situational 
awareness.  SAT addresses several of the core 
knowledge sharing and intelligence generation issues in 
KM to improve organizational effectiveness and 
decision making [20].  Among these are the knowledge 
sharing barriers of lack of trust and fear of loss of control 
over generated knowledge [21].  SAT addressed these 
issues by getting teams together in a manner that 
generated team trust and got them to produce 
recommendations that allowed all team members to 
claim ownership. 
Fusion center effectiveness is measured using 
metrics such as production numbers and product types 
[3].  Many studies at the Congressional level have 
identified that most of the reporting being completed is 
redundant or overcome by events by the time it has been 
released [2].  Additionally, because the funding is 
decided locally while the rating occurs federally, there 
is a disconnect between what fusion centers do on a 
daily basis and what they are graded for [13]. KM 
provides an excellent framework and lens through 
which to view the functions of fusion centers, and a 
more practical model for realizing the true value and 
return on investment which fusion centers can offer.  By 
exploring key concepts such as the sharing of 
information, transforming it into knowledge, and 
capturing it as actionable intelligence at the 
organizational level, the benefit of efforts such as SAT 
become clear.  When SAT is viewed in light of figure 1, 
the value of each step is apparent and demonstrates 
progress toward improved organizational effectiveness.    
The SAT case in this paper is presented as a 
mechanism for improved sharing of actionable 
intelligence at the local and regional level.  Previous 
discussion above has laid out the critiques against fusion 
centers, offering reasons why the deceptively simple 
concept of information sharing is so difficult to execute.  
Fortunately, a great deal of research has been conducted 
into the academic concepts which make this process 
work and work effectively.  KM researchers have 
identified three distinctive perspectives for individuals 
sharing information for the public good: they share 
knowledge without the need for reciprocity 
(cooperators), they feel obligated to share their 
knowledge (reciprocators), or they take knowledge for 
granted (free riders) [22]. The fusion center plays the 
role of the cooperator in sharing as much information as 
possible and facilitating the collaboration amongst all 
participants, who are reciprocators.  Additionally, KM 
explains why SAT improves knowledge sharing by 
looking at the concepts of affective organizational 
commitment reciprocity, and enhanced reputation.  
Affective organizational commitment is improved when 
members get a feeling of belongingness with the 
organization.  Fusion centers are multi-organizational 
resulting in lower feelings of belongingness.  SAT 
increases belongingness by having the fusion center 
members work together in multi-organizational teams 
[23]. Reciprocity increases knowledge sharing as 
members are more likely to share when they feel other 
members will also share.  Reciprocity is improved when 
the employees build relationships, SAT, does this 
through its team approach [24]. Enhanced reputation 
increases knowledge sharing as the sharer perceives it 
as a reward for sharing. SAT, through its team approach, 
allows its members to generate reputation through their 
participation in sharing [24].  Finally, organizational 
effectiveness has been shown to be improved when 
knowledge sharing is improved [25] so a SAT improves 
fusion center effectiveness by improving knowledge 
sharing. 
Additionally, KM views the analytical 
collaboration created by fusion centers is as de facto 
communities of practice (CoP).  CoPs are groups of 
people informally bound together by a shared practice 
and passion for a joint enterprise [26].  CoPs are a social 
construct, characterized as a social group that shares 
common objectives but which is not necessarily 
structured as an organizational unit [26].  Both 
definitions fit the purpose of the type of collaboration 
that fusion centers were created to facilitate, as well as 
the cooperation to which SATs lend themselves.   
When viewed as regional CoPs, fusion centers are 
ideally placed to fill the critical role of an organization 
champion within the collective group, where 
organizational champions (cooperators) bring sufficient 
knowledge and foster a rich intellectual environment are 
one of the key success factors of CoPs [21].  The 
challenge in enabling the fusion center to fill the role it 
was designed for is establishing the correct context to 
gather and form a CoP, as at any given time a fusion 
center could realistically be dedicating resources and 
analysts toward counterterrorism issues, criminal issues, 
and all-hazards issues simultaneously.  Each focus could 
generate its own CoP, with that CoP providing a 
collective knowledge base that varying members can 
access freely and to which they can contribute with or 
without expecting benefits [21].  
To keep the CoP viable and engaged requires more 
than just bringing like-minded and experienced law 
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enforcement organizations and analysts together.  KM 
researchers have revealed correlations that the fraction 
of cooperators is positively related to the total 
knowledge contribution and to the reciprocity level, 
while the reciprocity level positively affects knowledge 
contribution [21].  This reflects the ability of 
cooperators to influence the overall sharing of 
information and increase the total amount of 
information shared by participants in a CoP.  If 
participants do not see value in sharing or are not 
influenced to contribute some effort to the group, the 
overall effectiveness of a CoP goes down in generating 
collective knowledge or intelligence.  This is the beauty 
of collaborative SAT efforts: a single cooperator can 
generate the raw data and information which 
participating reciprocators and even free riders can 
analyze in a cooperative setting to generate new 
knowledge to the benefit of all. 
A single successful session can generate 
demonstrable results, and the credit can be shared 
among all participants.  The additional benefit to 
holding such sessions is that knowledge sharing 
research suggests individuals are more likely to share 
expertise inter-organizationally via face-to-face, than 
through other indirect or impersonal methods [21].  
Direct and interpersonal settings serve to break down 
many of the organizational and systemic barriers to 
information sharing and can facilitate greater 
information sharing via the systems that are required to 
conduct any mission worked by fusion centers.   
The meticulously structured nature of SATs allows 
future repetitions of such efforts that look at evolving 
threats and build upon the efforts of the analysts who 
have conducted these processes before them.  
Identifying any initially held cognitive biases, and the 
circumstances which led to any assumptions made by 
previous analysts gives future iterations a foundation 
upon which to build their efforts.  It also creates a body 
of notes for posterity that can provide future analysts 
with thought-provoking hypotheses or theories that had 
been discounted but could prove viable in light of new 
and emerging information.  In this sense, the process 
blends even more into the definition of a knowledge 
management success, “reusing knowledge to improve 
organizational effectiveness by providing the 
appropriate knowledge to those that need it when it is 
needed [17].  
The Revised Knowledge-Knowledge Management 
Pyramid (figure 1) depicts how raw inputs are examined 
in light of previous experience and learning, revised 
with research and analysis, and combined to become 
knowledge and organizational learning.  This provides 
the ideal context for describing the value of 
collaborative SAT efforts, while the former depicts 
quite simply the goals of the intelligence cycle. 
In the context of a SAT effort, the social network 
on the periphery of the figure 1 is indicative of the 
participating analysts, and their unique perspectives and 
experiences.  As the observations of reality are 
interpreted by the sensors (collection) which report the 
raw data, the application of the intelligence cycle 
transforms the inputs from data to information, and 
eventually to actionable intelligence.  As the process 
occurs, in addition to the arrows approaching 
organizational learning in the center, individual learning 
is depicted by the arrows radiating outward.  Thus, as 
the knowledge is created that benefits the group, so too 
is knowledge that benefits each participating analyst, 
growing both the whole and the sum of its parts 
simultaneously. 
Figure 1 includes additional levels of filters and 
sensors representing the recognition that technology has 
enabled the collection, aggregation, and filtering of data 
at a staggering level.  The Internet of Things (IoT), the 
ability to ingest unstructured data from multiple 
unrelated databases, and machine learning applications 
have driven the concept of big data with the goals of 
identifying intelligence for evidence based decision 
making, transforming intuitive based decision making 
to evidence based decision making, and pushing 
decision making to lower levels of the organization [27]. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the potential that could be 
reached by a more unified and organized approach to 
engaging in SAT efforts, and hints at the results that 
could be achieved.  As the event was conducted using 
limited inputs from the participating organizations, it is 
a testimony to the process that successful results were 
returned. 
With the resulting efforts captured both in 
intelligence products and AARs, analysts can review the 
outputs as well as how the inputs were treated to reach 
their analytical conclusions.  As organizational learning 
is the consequence of this process, knowledge and 
wisdom are captured at the analytical hub of the activity.  
With the fusion centers serving as the apex of this 
process, the wisdom generated through communal 
analysis is available for all participating agencies.   
The value generated by the structured sharing of 
information in this manner plays to the strengths which 
numerous studies identified in fusion centers, to include 
the formal and informal boundary-spanning connections 
at the analyst level.  It counters many of the weaknesses 
including lengthy deliberate production timelines and 
barriers to information sharing.  The additional benefit 
of the process is that it is simple and repeatable, with no 
specialized knowledge required above basic analyst 
training.  These concepts are introduced at the novice 
level, but far too few analysts ever execute them in their 
positions.  By increasing the use of these SAT efforts on 
a national level across the National Network of Fusion 
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Centers, many more regional issues could be engaged 
and more available data could be transformed into 
actionable analysis.   
Additionally, fusion centers have expanded their 
focus capacity.  While this was initially met with 
friction, and was cast in a negative light by official 
Congressional and Department of Homeland Security 
reviews, this shift demonstrated an organic settling of 
fusion centers into a needed role to provide a regional 
context for both criminal and all-hazards threat 
information.  The Department of Homeland Security 
Inspector General Report [28] that arrived at the same 
conclusion, that up until that point, some intelligence 
products could better meet state and local needs.  These 
observations drove a natural migration where fusion 
centers shifted their focus to better fill local and regional 
requirements, particularly as state and local 
governments began to pay an increasing portion of 
fusion center operating costs. 
Between these efforts and others, fusion centers 
began to mature around 2010, demonstrating many 
successes both in contributing to the disruption of 
terrorist plots at the local and regional level, as well as 
providing valuable all-crimes, all-hazards threat support 
to state and local law enforcement jurisdictions.  
However, many challenges to reaching the initial 
information sharing goals remain.  Chief among them 
are the difficulty of conducting true intelligence fusion 
processes and disseminating jointly authored analytical 
products in a timely manner.  As critique after critique 
identified, too often fusion centers and the federal 
agency representatives detailed to them failed to 
produce analytical products that kept up with the speed 
of relevance.  
One aspect of that issue missing from this paper is 
the study of the information systems (IS) utilized by 
these agencies to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
collaborative analysis to produce intelligence.  The 
primary existing networks have been identified as the 
Homeland Secure Data Network for classified 
information sharing, and the Homeland Security 
Information Network for controlled but unclassified 
information sharing between federal, state, and local 
partners.  Discussion of these IS and their contributions 
to or detractions from the issue of information sharing 
and collaborative analysis have been avoided 
deliberately to focus on the human factors which fusion 
centers can largely control or influence.  However, these 
systems do have an impact on KM and knowledge 
sharing as is shown by Figure 4 where the impact of 
technical resources influences the success of KM. 
The re-specified Jennex-Olfman KM Success 
Model, figure 4, identifies three primary driving factors 
for successful KM efforts.  Those drivers are system 
quality, or the technological resources and human 
infrastructure devoted to the effort; knowledge quality, 
the usefulness and accuracy of the content and its ability 
to help users in performing their duties; and service 
quality, the support of the effort demonstrated by 
leadership/management support [27]. 
 
 
Figure 4, Re-specified Jennex Olfman KM Success 
Model [25] 
 
This model offers fusion centers insight that 
supports that improving fusion center effectiveness also 
needs IS sufficient to support effective knowledge 
sharing and applies directly to conducting successful 
SAT events.  Another takeaway from figure 4 is the 
equal importance of leadership buy-in to the process, 
demonstrated by having direction from the top of the 
organization that appropriates the resources needed for 
KM as well as creates and maintains the knowledge 
sharing, knowledge using culture necessary for KM to 
succeed [27].  Placing this concept on equal footing with 
both the quality of the processed knowledge and quality 
of the systems and analysts conducting the efforts 
reflects the importance that organizational culture has 
on achieving successful information sharing results.   
Finally, further research has found that while figure 
4 shows the precursors to KM success, they also form 
measures of KM success. With leadership support, 
knowledge quality can likewise be improved to feed the 
process.  By increasing the amount and quality of data 
available to be analyzed through incorporating the 
myriad open-source sensors and resources available to 
fusion center partners, and utilizing technological filters 
including artificial intelligence algorithms to parse the 
data into digestible packets, SAT efforts could receive a 
significant head-start in the process of producing 
actionable intelligence. Finally, leadership support can 
ensure technology resources are available for a trained 
and eager cadre of analysts to fully utilize in their 
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collaborative efforts and set the mission up for success, 
where recognition of KM success is getting the right 
knowledge to the right people at the right time [28]. A 
further suggestion is that this research can be used to 
create additional metrics for measuring fusion center 
success focused on leadership, content, and center focus 
to be used in addition to the previously discussed 
process measure. 
6. Conclusions  
The key conclusions of this paper are that 
knowledge sharing and fusion center effectiveness can 
be improved by using SAT.  SAT increases affective 
organizational commitment, reciprocity, and enhanced 
reputation by fusing the members of the fusion center 
into teams and creating a CoP.  Fusion center 
effectiveness is increased as it has been shown that 
improving knowledge sharing will improve 
organizational effectiveness.  Additionally, SAT 
performance can be improved by improving the IS used 
to better support the human factors of affective 
organizational commitment reciprocity and reputation 
enhancement. 
The net benefits of a SAT effort producing 
actionable intelligence are clear to the decision maker, 
and can directly affect the environment in a timely 
manner.  Timely results are at a premium in resource-
constrained environments.  When funding for national 
security efforts is viewed as a zero-sum game, each 
agency with a role in this mission must seek both 
efficiencies and successes to maintain or improve 
funding levels which come at the expense of another 
organization in the field.  This is one of the additional 
drivers of joint intelligence products, and why 
contributing organizations benefit from successful 
collaborations.  When bureaucratic oversight processes 
delay the results to the point of irrelevance, additional 
practices are required to generate timely and useful 
intelligence that also benefit multiple agencies.  Thus, 
organized and focused SAT efforts, conducted under the 
National Network of Fusion Centers, are that 
alternative.   
SAT is not a silver bullet to overcome every hurdle 
to knowledge sharing, and it does require an amount of 
experience and initiative to properly execute.  The 
drivers of the previously explored KM success model 
should be enacted while building that experience.  If this 
model were to become institutionalized at the fusion 
center level, across the National Network of Fusion 
Centers, both the capability and capacity to conduct 
truly effective SAT efforts would quickly expand.  This 
process is likewise not a response to every critique 
levied at fusion centers for failures in information 
sharing, but it is a proposed solution to strengthening 
local and regional relationships between analysts, 
bringing like-minded professionals together to look at 
shared problems, and creating the types of opportunities 
where boundary-spanning activities can occur.  In short, 
it is that effort to use many of the things that are best in 
fusion centers to counter some of those issues which 
outsiders view as wrong with fusion centers. 
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